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No. 615

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

JOHN VOLPE, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WALTER J. HICKEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, STANLEY S. RESOR, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WILLIAM F. CASSIDY, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, PETITIONERS

v.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY, THE SIERRA CLUB AND THE VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the above-named federal officials, petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the district court (App., *infra*, pp. 7–27) is reported at 302 F. Supp. 1083. The opinion of the court of appeals (App., *infra*, pp. 33–50) is reported at 425 F.2d 97.

402—618—70

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 16, 1970 (App., *infra*, p. 51). On July 10, 1970, Mr. Justice Harlan extended the time within which to file this petition to August 29, 1970. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U.S.C. 401 *et seq.*, as amended, specific congressional authorization is required for the construction of a stone and concrete structure in and along one shore of the Hudson River to contain earth fill and a causeway leading from that fill back to the existing shoreline, or whether the authority to permit such projects has been delegated to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U.S.C. 401 *et seq.*, provides in part (33 U.S.C. 401):

> It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over or in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river * * * of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army: * * *.

Section 10 of the Act provides in part (33 U.S.C. 403):

> The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any * * * navigable river, or other water of the United States * * * except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill [in a navigable waterway of the United States] * * * unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.

STATEMENT

These proceedings were instituted by the respondents in January 1969 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to enjoin, *inter alia*, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers from issuing a permit requested by the New York Department of Transportation under the provisions of Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, *supra*, and applicable regulations thereunder (33 C.F.R. 209.110 *et seq.*). The permit, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army and issued by the Corps of Engineers on January 27, 1969, allowed the State

> to dredge and place fill [in the Hudson River] protected by stone slope protection and to con-

> struct piers and bulkheads with floats and mooring piles; the dredged material to be suitably retained by dikes to prevent its return into the waterway * * *

in conjunction with the State's proposed construction of the Hudson River Expressway.[1]

After the permit was issued, respondents sought a preliminary injunction restraining its delivery, which was denied. *Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley* v. *Volpe*, 297 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. N.Y.). The court of appeals affirmed that denial in an unreported decision. After a 29-day trial, the district court concluded that the Secretary and the Corps had exceeded their authority in issuing the permit because congressional consent for the construction of the "dike" called for in the permit had not been obtained, as required by Section 9 of the Act, *supra* (App., *infra*, p. 14). The court further concluded that the permit was improperly issued because the causeway extending from the southern end of the proposed fill back to the shoreline, shown in the State's tentative plans for the expressway, had not been approved by the Secretary of Transportation[2] (App., *infra*, pp. 15–17). The district court invalidated the permit and enjoined the issuance of another permit without the prior approval of the Secretary of Transportation and the consent of Congress.

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[1] No part of the highway project will involve the expenditure of federal funds.

[2] The Department of Transportation Act, 80 Stat. 931, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1651, 1655, transferred jurisdiction over "causeways" from the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of Transportation.

The court of appeals agreed with the district court's interpretation of the statute (App., *infra*, p. 48), and affirmed its issuance of the injunction.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The petitioners join in the petition to be filed in this case by the Commissioner of Transportation of the State of New York, *Parker* v. *Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley*, and concur with and support points 1 and 2 of the Reasons for Granting the Writ set forth in the Commissioner's petition. In order not to burden the court with duplicated arguments, the present petitioners incorporate here those points of the petition in *Parker's* case relating to the question of the authority of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers of the Army to issue the permit involved here.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in the Commissioner's petition, as referred to above, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.

SHIRO KASHIWA,
Assistant Attorney General.

EDMUND B. CLARK,
ROBERT S. LYNCH,
Attorneys.

AUGUST 1970.

APPENDIX A

United States District Court
S. D. New York
July 11, 1969
(Nos. 69 Civ. 295, 305, 354 and 448)

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY AND SIERRA CLUB, PLAINTIFFS

v.

JOHN VOLPE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WALTER F. HICKEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, STANLEY S. RESOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WILLIAM F. CASSIDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS OF THE U.S. ARMY, DEFENDANTS

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY AND SIERRA CLUB, PLAINTIFFS

v.

J. BURCH MCMORRAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT

VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK, PLAINTIFFS

v.

JOHN VOLPE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WALTER F. HICKEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, STANLEY S. RESOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WILLIAM F. CASSIDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS OF THE U.S. ARMY, DEFENDANTS

VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK, PLAINTIFFS

v.

J. BIGELOW MCMORRAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT

Winer, Neuburger & Sive, New York City, for plaintiffs (David Sive and Alfred Forsyth, New York City, of counsel).

Robert M. Morgenthau, U.S. Atty. for the Southern District of New York, for federal defendants (Peter R. DeFilippi and H. Thomas Coghill, New York City, of counsel).

Louis Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, for defendant McMorran (Mark F. Walsh and Joel Sachs, New York City, of counsel).

Thomas F. Murphy, District Judge.

These four actions, consolidated for trial, challenge the construction of the proposed Hudson River Expressway on a variety of grounds.

The Citizens Committee for the Hudson River Valley is an unincorporated association of citizens who reside in the area of the proposed Expressway. The

Sierra Club is a non-profit conservationist corporation organized in California with various chapters throughout the United States. Tarrytown is an incorporated village of New York State, and one of the communities through which the Expressway will pass.

The federal defendants are public officials charged with certain statutory duties related to the issues involved and the defendant, J. Burch McMorran, is the Commissioner of the Department of Transportation of the State of New York, the builder of the proposed Expressway.

The Expressway, as proposed by the New York State Department of Transportation, is planned to be a six lane arterial highway which will accommodate both passenger and commercial traffic. As conceived it will extend approximately nine miles along the east shore of the Hudson River from the Tappan Zee Bridge at Tarrytown north to Crotonville, New York. Approximately 22,000 feet of the road will rest on 9,500,000 cubic yards of fill which will extend at its widest point 1300 feet into the river. No part of the project will involve the expenditure of federal funds.

On February 21, 1968, the State Department of Transportation, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 403 (Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899), applied to the Corps of Engineers for a permit authorizing the fill operation which would take approximately two years to complete. When the permit was authorized by the Secretary of the Army and issued by the Corps on January 27, 1969, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction restraining its delivery. This relief was denied, Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F.Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), and the Court of

Appeals affirmed (2d Cir. 1969)[1] but ordered an immediate trial on the merits.

The plaintiffs' major claim is that since the Expressway project involves *dikes, causeways and bridges* to be built over or in a navigable waterway of the United States, the Corps exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the permit without the prior approval of Congress and/or the federal Department of Transportation, as required by 33 U.S.C. § 401 of the same Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.

Section 403, under which the Corps issued the permit provides:

> "The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited * * * and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill [in a navigable waterway of the United States] * * * unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same." 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899).

Section 401, claimed by the plaintiffs to be applicable, provides:

> "It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bride, dam, dike, or causeway over or in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river * * * of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have

[1] In Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F.Supp. 809, which granted New York State's motion to dismiss the actions against it on the ground of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff's claims against McMorran were restricted to whether "[s]ection 340-c of the New York Highway Law is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment and [is the construction of] the Expressway * * * a violation of their Fifth Amendment rights." 297 F.Supp. at 814.

> been obtained and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army * * *." 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1899).

The needed approval of the Secretary of Transportation of the United States becomes a factor in the case as a result of the evolution of section 401. By two subsequent statutes "bridges" were removed from the specific consent of Congress requirement. In 1946 Congress enacted the General Bridge Act, 33 U.S.C. § 525 et seq. Section 525 of this Act grants the consent of Congress for the construction of any bridge over navigable waters if the bridge is approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army. However, Congress still reserved its jurisdiction over dikes and causeways referred to in section 401 of Title 33. In 1966 Congress enacted the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq. Section 1655 of that Act transferred certain powers and duties of other federal departments to the Secretary of Transportation. Subsection (g) of that section transferred jurisdiction over bridges and causeways in navigable waters of the United States from the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of Transportation.

Consequently, the construction of a bridge over or in navigable waterways now requires approval of the Corps of Engineers acting under the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Transportation; the construction of a dike requires the consent of Congress and the Corps of Engineers when authorized by the Secretary of the Army; the construction of a causeway requires the consent of Congress and the approval of the Secretary of Transportation.

Since the Corps of Engineers as authorized by the

Secretary of the Army issued the permit without the consent of Congress or the Secretary of Transportation, it exceeded its statutory authority if there is a bridge, dike, or causeway involved in the permitted project. We come, therefore, to what is the most crucial issue in the case.

It is undisputed that the Hudson River is a navigable waterway of the United States, and that in both the permit issued by the Corps, and the New York State plans accompanying the permit there are numerous references to "dikes." Page 1 of the Permit states: "you are hereby authorized by the Secretary of the Army to dredge and place fill protected by stone slope protection and to construct piers and bulkheads with floats and mooring piles; the dredged material to be suitably *retained by dikes* to prevent its return into the waterway * * *." (Emphasis added.) In the State plans or drawings attached to the permit there are four references to stone and/or rock dikes.

In the plans prepared by the State in connection with the securing of bids, three types of dikes are specifically illustrated and described. The main type, the rock dike, will run along the entire length of the western side of the fill in order to prevent the fill from returning to the river.

The defendants, while accusing the plaintiffs of arguing semantics, postulate that what is called a dike (by the various engineers who prepared the plans for the State Department of Transportation and the Corps of Engineers) is not really a dike since a real dike has a different purpose from their dikes. They also argue, assuming dikes are involved, that section 401 is still not applicable since their dikes would not substantially affect navigation. The court in denying the preliminary injunction agreed with this latter

argument reasoning that the plaintiffs would probably not succeed on the merits because the Expressway would not substantially interfere with navigation and because the federal Department of Transportation interposed no objection.[2] The Court of Appeals in affirming the denial of the temporary injunction did not pass on this issue.

The defendants urge that Congress, in using the term "dike" in 1899, meant a structure that would be within the definition set forth in Chambers Technical Dictionary, p. 273 (3d Rev. ed. with Supp. 1958), which was originally published in 1940, i.e., "a wall or embankment of timber, stone, concrete, fascines, or other material, built as a training works for a river so as rigidly to confine flow within definite limits over the length treated." From this definition they conclude that a real dike must substantially affect navigation since it confines river flow, and since the dikes in their plans do not substantially affect navigation they are not dikes as Congress used the term.

The plaintiffs submit that Congress, in prohibiting "any dike" reserved for itself the determination of the effect of the dike on navigation and any other matter deemed of consequence. Therefore, they argue, that once a dike, any dike, is to be constructed in navigable water of the United States it is Congress, and not the courts, who will consider its effects on navigation in determining whether to approve the structure or no.

What is posed, therefore, is are there dikes involved

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[2] The denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction does not affect our final determination of the issues. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 15 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 65.21 (2d ed. 1953).

in this project and what did Congress mean when it legislated, "it shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of *any bridge, dam, dike or causeway* over or in any * * * navigable river * * * until the consent of Congress to the building of such structure shall have been obtained * * *."

We hold, based on the evidence presented at trial, that "dikes," characterized as such by the defendants, are to be constructed along the western side of the fill and that Congress when it said "any dike" over or in any navigable river meant exactly that. Therefore, the Corps of Engineers exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the permit which enables the State to commence advertising for bids.

In the absence of any legislative or judicial authority to support the defendants' theory of statutory interpretation we apply the ordinary meaning to the term "any dike." Dike is defined as "[a] bank, as of earth, thrown up to form a barrier, line of demarcation or the like * * *," Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., p. 730 (1954); "An embankment for controlling or holding back the waters of the sea or a river." Random House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 403 (1967). "Statutes are to be construed by attributing its ordinary meaning to the language used." United States v. Peller, 170 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1948). Consequently, we hold that if Congress meant to confine its jurisdiction to only those dikes that substantially affect navigation, it would have said so. Since proposed dikes are involved and will be "over or in" a navigable river of the United States, we leave to Congress, when it decides if it will approve the project, the consideration of the effect of the dikes on navigation.

Even if this interpretation is incorrect we find that the proposed rock dikes come within the definition

proposed by the defendants, i.e., the rock dike will control the flow of the river insofar as it will prevent the river from eroding the fill and returning to the natural shore line. It will also, according to a government expert, increase the force of the ebb tide by 10 percent.

In addition to the consent of Congress being required because of the presence of dikes, we hold that approval of the Secretary of Transportation of the United States is required since causeways are also involved in the construction of the project.

The plaintiffs claim that the entire fill area of the project will be a causeway since it will be support for a raised road over water. We disagree and accept the defendants' definition of a causeway, i.e., its ordinary meaning connotes a raised road across water or marshy land with the water or marshy land on both sides of the road. Since the fill will be bounded by water on only one side (the west), it, in itself, is not a causeway.

However, the proof at trial clearly shows a causeway supporting the road where it leaves the natural shoreline south of the Tappan Zee Bridge until the road reaches the southernmost point of the fill. On the map, opposite page 14 of the booklet "The Hudson River Expressway and the Hudson River Expressway Park," which was published by the State Department of Transportation, the southern lane of the Expressway at this point is clearly out in the river with water on both sides. The detailed model of the project, which was introduced into evidence by the State, also shows this portion of the Expressway to clearly be a causeway within the definition urged by the defendants.

While this causeway is not per se part of the fill project which the Corps of Engineers' permit au-

thorized, we hold that the Corps still had the obligation to consider it and recognize its reality before issuing the permit.

The Corps in considering the application of the State was not operating in a vacuum. It had before it detailed maps, drawings and plans of the entire project. It certainly knew the entire route of the six lane road. Before it issued the permit the Corps of Engineers held public hearings at which time a full description of the project and the route of the road was given. By not securing the approval of the United States Secretary of Transportation on the causeway it was in effect delaying the inevitable by requiring the State, after it had expended millions of dollars in filling the river with 9,500,000 cubic yards of fill, to then apply for the Secretary's approval of the causeway which is immediately south of the fill. By doing so the Corps effectively relinquished the jurisdiction of the federal Department of Transportation, and its discretion to deny the approval of the future causeway, for how could the Secretary of Transportation deny the future request, if he were to be so inclined, after the enormous expense and work the State would have had already put into the project.

Such a piecemeal approach to the exercise of federal agency jurisdiction would also frustrate one of the main purposes of the Department of Transportation Act, i. e., the conservation of the country's natural resources.[3] Before the Secretary of Transportation is to approve any project within his jurisdic-

[3] "It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites." 49 U.S.C. § 1651(b)(2) (1966).

tion he has to determine, *inter alia*, the effects of the project on the natural resources of the area.[4] If this massive fill project is completed before his approval is sought, he will be presented with a *fait accompli*. There will not be any need for him to consider the effects on natural resources as the harm, if any, will be done.

In view of this congressional intent encompassed in the Department of Transportation Act we hold that the Corps of Engineers exceeded its statutory authority in ignoring the presence of the causeway[5] when it issued the permit without prior approval of the Secretary of Transportation.[6]

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[4] "After August 23, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and, (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use." 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f).

"The Hudson River Expressway and the Hudson River Expressway Park," published by the New York State Department of Transportation, states: "The setting within which these complementing projects are to be undertaken is characterized by striking natural beauty, important historical significance, and harmonious residential development" (at page 1).

[5] Since the presence of causeways in the project necessitates the approval of the Secretary of Transportation, we have not deemed it necessary to determine if bridges are present.

[6] Since the Corps of Engineers has exceeded its statutory authority within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C) (1966), we have not deemed it necessary to determine if the Corps was also arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of § 706(2) (A) of Title 5. See note 7, *infra*.

The defendants have consistently urged that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. Concededly there is no separate statutory authority which grants jurisdiction to the district courts to have a decision of the Secretary of the Army reviewed. Yet, we hold that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., justifies this Court's jurisdiction.[7]

While there is an apparent conflict in this circuit, the Supreme Court has implemented what appears to be a presumption in favor of a finding of jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), it was held that the courts should restrict access to judicial review "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent * * *." 387 U.S. at 141, 87 S.Ct. at 1511, citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962). See also, Powelton

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[7] "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.

"Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704.

"The reviewing court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory rights * * *." 5 U.S.C. § 706.

Civic Home Own. Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F.Supp. 809 (E.D.Pa. 1968).

A 1966 decision in this circuit held that the Administrative Procedure Act constituted an affirmative grant of jurisdiction with respect to the review of federal administrative actions. Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966). Judge McLean in Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F.Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.1967), followed the reasoning of *Cappadora* and referred to the Administrative Procedure Act as a "jurisdictional statute." 270 F.Supp. at 659.

A second circuit case that appears to hold, and has later been construed to hold [8] that the Administrative Procedure Act does not confer jurisdiction is Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894, 81 S.Ct. 225, 5 L.Ed.2d 188 (1960). The court held in that case that the suit, while termed one for judicial review, was in reality a contract action against the United States and properly belonged in the Court of Claims. It went on to say that the Administrative Procedure Act does not extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases not otherwise within their competence. Even though the court stated that the Act does not grant jurisdiction, it never had to reach that determination since there was really no agency action to be reviewed.

Since the presumption in favor of jurisdiction has not been rebutted by a clear and convincing presentation of an opposite legislative intent, we hold that this court has the necessary jurisdiction to rule on the dispute under the Administrative Procedure Act.

This court also has jurisdiction of the suit

[8] National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 267 F.Supp. 117, 119 at n. 8 (S.D.N.Y.1967).

brought by the Village of Tarrytown under the federal question statute which provides:

> "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 * * * and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958).

The Village's claim is that it will lose tax revenues by the State condemnation of taxable property in the Village. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf., 384 U.S. 941, 86 S.Ct. 1462, 16 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966), the same claim was the basis of one of the petitioners' standing to sue. See also, TVA v. Polk County, 68 F.Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn.1945). Cf. Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957); Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956).[9]

We also hold that all of the plaintiffs have standing necessary to maintain these actions. Under *Scenic Hudson, supra,* there is little doubt that the Village of Tarrytown has the necessary standing. There the court held, "The towns that are co-petitioners with Scenic Hudson have standing because the transmission lines * * * reduce tax revenues collected from privately held land, and significantly interfere with long-range community planning." 354 F.2d at 616.

This is precisely what was proved by the Village in the instant case, namely, loss of tax revenues and

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[9] Since jurisdiction has been established under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Question Statute, we do not determine if jurisdiction exists under the Mandamus Act (28 U.S.C. § 1361), the Commerce and Anti-Trust Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1337), or the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201).

interference with the Urban Renewal project already in progress in the Village. The proof offered by the Village of Tarrytown that it would lose over $10,000 in tax revenues contained some errors in computation. Nevertheless this court is satisfied that the amount will at the very minimum exceed $10,000.

The standing problem becomes more acute with the Sierra Club and the Citizens Committee as they admittedly have no personal economic claim to assert. Rather they are "aggrieved" by the alleged destruction of the natural resources of the river. *Scenic Hudson, supra,* and its interpretation by *Road Review, supra,* create standing in this case if this court can find a "legislative intent" to create standing, absent a monetary claim, in the various statutes involved.

Scenic Hudson involved the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.). Section 313(b) of that Act (16 U.S.C. § 825*l*(b)) grants the right of judicial review to any party aggrieved by an order of the Federal Power Commission. The main petitioner was an unincorporated association consisting of a number of nonprofit conservationist organizations. Like the Sierra Club and the Citizens Committee in this case, they had no direct economic interest in the controversy. Yet, they were found to be "aggrieved parties" because the Federal Power Act was held to create a public interest in the scenic, historical, and recreational values of the area. The Court held:

> "In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be * * * aggrieved parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests." 354 F.2d at 616.

The *Road Review* case involved a dispute under the Federal Highways Act (23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). Again, there was no economic loss on the part of the conservationist plaintiffs. Unlike the Federal Power Act, the Federal Highways Act contained no specific authorization for judicial review. Instead the plaintiffs relied on the Administrative Procedure Act. The court, following the reasoning of *Scenic Hudson*, cited sections of the Highways Act (23 U.S.C. §§ 134, 138) and 23 C.F.R. § 1.6(c), all to the effect that administrative decisions under the Act must consider local needs, parks, historic sites and natural resources. 270 F.Supp. at 660–661. The court stated that these provisions were "sufficient, under the principle of *Scenic Hudson*, to manifest a congressional intent that towns, local civic organizations, and conservation groups are to be considered 'aggrieved' by agency action which allegedly has disregarded their interests. I see no reason why the word 'aggrieved' should have a different meaning in the Administrative Procedure Act from the meaning given to it under the Federal Power Act." 270 F.Supp. at 661.

The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic, and scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give standing to groups interested in these factors and who allege that these factors are not being properly considered by the agency.[10]

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[10] After the plaintiffs had rested, the State moved unsuccessfully to dismiss since the plaintiffs had introduced no evidence to show their interest in the natural, historic, and scenic resources of the area and hence had failed to prove their standing. During the State's case this interest was proved through the testimony of members of the Citizens Committee and Sierra Club. We base our decision that plaintiffs Citizens Committee

In the instant case the Department of Transportation Act manifests the same congressional concern.[11] One of the regulations under which the Corps of Engineers issued the permit, 33 C.F.R. § 209.330, calls for the consideration of the effects of the permit on fish, recreation, pollution, and natural resources as well as navigation.[12]

Therefore, under the guidelines of *Scenic Hudson* and *Road Review* both the Sierra Club and the Citizens Committee have the requisite standing to maintain these actions.

The remaining claim of the plaintiffs is that McMorran as a State official is proceeding under an unconstitutional statute, i. e., 340–c of the New York Highway Law, McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 25, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights of the plaintiffs and, accordingly, should be enjoined. See note 1 *supra*.

The plaintiffs' brief characterizes the claim as follows: "Whether Article VII (New York State Constitution) has been violated is perhaps not a question before this court. The extent of the power granted to McMorran by the Expressway Law, § 30 of the Highway Law, and the legislature's lump sum budgets is of the essence of the constitutional claim."

Section 340–c of New York's Highway Law (Mc-

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and Sierra Club have standing based on the evidence as a whole, including that introduced by the defendant New York State. Bates v. Miller, 2 Cir., 133 F.2d 645 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, Miller v. Bates, 320 U.S. 210, 63 S.Ct. 1446, 87 L.Ed. 1848 (1943); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2496 (3d ed. 1940).

[11] See notes 3 and 4 *supra*.

[12] Public Law 89–605, 80 Stat. 847 (1966) states that the Hudson River basin contains resources of "immense economic, natural, scenic, historic and recreational value to all the citizens of the United States * * *."

Kinney's 1965), which authorizes construction of the Expressway provides:

> "State expressway routes are hereby set forth and generally described as follows * * *.
>
> "Beginning at a point on interstate route 503 in the vicinity of Beacon or in the vicinity of Wiccopee, to be determined by the superintendent of public works, thence in a generally southerly direction to the vicinity of Ossining and thence continuing southerly, west of U.S. route nine, along or near the Hudson River to a connection or connections with existing highways, as determined by the superintendent of public works, in the vicinity of the structure on the Governor Thomas E. Dewey Thruway known as 'The Tappan Zee Bridge'."

The plaintiffs claim this statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Commissioner in that it prescribes no standards to be followed in determining, *inter alia*, the exact route, width or nature of the Expressway. We disagree. To require a State legislature to prescribe every detail of a proposed State road, would shortly put an end to road construction on a State level. In Aloyian v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 211 F.Supp. 668, 669 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 186, 83 S.Ct. 265, 9 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1962), it was held that the delegation of the exact path of a highway was not unlawful. The "[l]egislature cannot 'constitutionally (be) required to appraise before hand the myriad situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for each situation. Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel (the Legislature) to prescribe detailed rules.'" City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Board, 5 N.Y.2d 164, 169, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588, 156 N.E.2d 301 (1959), citing

American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103.

Moreover, the Commissioner of Transportation, when implementing section 340-c of the Highway Law, is bound by the procedures and standards set forth by the New York State Legislature in section 340-d of the Highway Law. This latter section provides for, *inter alia*, the number and separation of lanes, access to the expressways and their maintenance. Sections 10 and 11 of the Highway Act mandate that the Commissioner make surveys, maps and plans in connection with the construction of roads. Before the Commissioner awards any construction contract, he must follow the procedures prescribed by the Legislature in section 38 of the Highway Law. In short, the Commissioner is not operating solely under section 340-c. Rather, he is bound by the many regulatory provisions contained in the entire Highway Law of New York.

We also hold that failure to give prior notice of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not violative of due process. United States v. Southerly Portion of Bodie Is., 114 F.Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.N.C. 1953); United States v. Winn, 83 F.Supp. 172, 174 (W.D.S.C.1949). Section 30 of New York's Highway Law sets forth the condemnation procedures to be followed by the Commissioner. Condemnation maps are filed in the Office of the County Clerk of the county in which the property is located and in the Department of State. Upon filing with the County Clerk, title vests in the State. Notice is then personally served on the former property owner who may then commence suit in the Court of Claims. If a former property owner remains on the land after the taking, the Commissioner must commence an evic-

tion proceeding on 60 days notice. These procedures clearly meet the requirements of due process. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 40 S.Ct. 62, 64 L.Ed. 135 (1919); Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 342, 229 N.Y.S.2d 400, 183 N.E.2d 684 (1962).

Although plaintiffs' complaints against McMorran make no mention of the appropriations the New York State legislature has provided for the Department of Transportation, there was received in evidence plaintiffs' Exhibit 91 which sets forth the appropriations for the Department of Transportation and its predecessor, the Department of Public Works, for the last few years, including the 1969 appropriation of $371,500,000. No other evidence was introduced on this score and plaintiffs' motion to conform their pleadings to the proof was granted.

We will assume that Exhibit 91 contains the appropriation bill passed by the New York Legislature in 1969, and that the budget procedures set forth by Article VII, §§ 1–4 of New York State's Constitution were carried out, resulting is a lump sum appropriation for the Department of Transportation in the amount of $371,500,000 for the purposes therein stated.

What puzzles us is why a lump sum appropriation violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights of the plaintiffs. As we understand the plaintiffs' claim, it appears to be based on the lump sum appropriation as distinguished from an appropriation with more particularization. But particularization is not always necessary or expedient, especially where road construction is involved. People v. Tremaine, 281 N.Y. 1, 7, 21 N.E.2d 891 (1939).

In any event, no evidence or authorities have been offered (other than to demonstrate that the appropri-

ation is a lump sum), to show the unconstitutionality of the appropriation and/or the alleged violations of the plaintiffs' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights.

Accordingly the constitutional claims of the plaintiffs are dismissed.

Let this opinion stand for our findings of fact and conclusions of law. Settle order on notice.

APPENDIX B

(69 Civ. 295)

United States District Court, Southern District of New York

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY AND SIERRA CLUB, PLAINTIFFS

against

JOHN VOLPE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WALTER F. HICKEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, STANLEY S. RESOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WILLIAM F. CASSIDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS OF THE U.S. ARMY, DEFENDANTS

(69 Civ. 305)

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY AND SIERRA CLUB, PLAINTIFFS

against

J. BURCH MCMORRAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT

(69 Civ. 354)

VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK, PLAINTIFFS

against

JOHN VOLPE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WALTER F. HICKEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, STANLEY S. RESOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND WILLIAM F. CASSIDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHIEF OF ENGINEERS; CORPS OF ENGINEERS OF THE U.S. ARMY, DEFENDANTS

(69 Civ. 448)

VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK, PLAINTIFFS

against

J. BURCH MCMORRAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT

Plaintiffs having commenced these actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and defendants having duly appeared herein, and these actions having been consolidated for trial, and the issues having been duly tried before this Court, without a Jury, and this Court having rendered its opinion and made findings of fact and conclusions of law herein on July 11, 1969,

IT IS ADJUDGED, DECLARED AND DECREED, that the construction of the Hudson River Expressway by the State of New York and the Department of Transportation of the State of New York involves the construction of dikes and causeways over or in a navigable river of the United States, to wit, the Hudson River,

within the meaning of Title 33 United States Code §§ 401 and 525 and Title 49 United States Code § 1655, which construction, insofar as the same involves the construction of a dike or dikes requires the consent of the Congress of the United States and the Corps of Engineers of the Department of the Army of the United States, when authorized by the Secretary of the Army of the United States, and, insofar as the same involves the construction of a causeway or causeways, requires the consent of the Congress and the approval of the Secretary of Transportation of the United States; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Corps of Engineers, on or about January 27, 1969, exceeded its statutory authority in issuing a permit to the State of New York and the Department of Transportation of the State of New York to dredge and fill in the Hudson River for the construction of said Expressway ~~without the prior approval of the Secretary of Transportation of the United States and in the absence of the consent of the Congress of the United States,~~ which permit be and the same is declared to be unlawful, null, void and of no force and effect, *ab initio;* and it is further

T.F.M.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendant William F. Cassidy, individually and as Chief of Engineers, Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, and all persons in active concert with him and his successors and assigns, be and they are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from issuing a permit to the State of New York and to the Department of Transportation of the State of New

York to dredge and fill in the Hudson River for the construction of said Expressway, without the prior approval of the Secretary of Transportation of the United States and in the absence of the consent of Congress of the United States; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the ~~State of New York, its officers, agents, and employees, and all Departments and Agencies of the State of New York, their respective officers, agents and employees, including specifically but without limitation, the Department of Transportation of the State of New York~~ T.F.M. and defendant J. Burch McMorran, individually and as Commissioner of the Department of Transportation of the State of New York, be and they each are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from proceeding in any manner with the construction of said Expressway, ~~including, *inter alia*, soliciting or accepting any bids for dredging and filling in the Hudson River for such purpose, soliciting or accepting any bids for the construction of any dike, bridge or causeway, dredging and filling in said river or constructing any dike, bridge or causeway for such purpose, or instituting or prosecuting any proceedings to acquire any land or other property for~~ T.F.M. such purpose, unless and until the consent of the Congress to the construction of such dikes, bridges and causeways shall have been obtained and unless and until the approval of the Department of Transportation of the United States has been obtained for the construction of such causeway or causeways and any bridge or bridges: and it is further

~~Ordered, that plaintiff's claim that Section 340e of the New York Highway Law is an~~
T.F.M. ~~unconstitutional delegation of legislative power be and the same hereby is dismissed; and it is further~~

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant McMorran's motion to dismiss all the
T.F.M. claims in the four actions based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the Expressway Law (§ 340-e, Highway Law of the State of New York), be and the same is hereby in all respects granted; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
T.F.M. complaints in the actions against J. Burch McMorran as primary defendant (69 Civ. 305 and 69 Civ. 448) be and the same hereby are in all respects dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED, that costs shall be taxed against
T.F.M. defendants in 69 Civ. 295 and 69 Civ. 354 ~~and in against of~~ [sic] ~~the plaintiffs in 69 Civ. 305 and 69 Civ. 448 each of these consolidated actions in accordance with law; and it is further~~

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that any party hereto may apply to this Court for such other and further relief not inconsistent with the facts found and law declared in the aforesaid decision of this Court as may be deemed requisite for the fair enforcement of this order, judgment and decree, upon five days notice to all parties.

Dated: New York, N.Y., July 25, 1969.

Enter,

THOS. F. MURPHY.

APPENDIX C

United States Court of Appeals

Second Circuit

Argued Dec. 8, 1969

Decided April 16, 1970

(Nos. 428–43, Dockets 34010, 34057, 34058, 34081, 34099, 34100)

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY, THE SIERRA CLUB AND THE VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

v.

JOHN VOLPE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WALTER J. HICKEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES, STANLEY S. RESOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WILLIAM F. CASSIDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, CORPS OF ENGINEERS OF THE U.S. ARMY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

J. BURCH MCMORRAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, INTERVENOR-APPELLANT

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY, THE SIERRA CLUB AND THE VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

v.

J. BURCH MCMORRAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

David Sive, New York City (Alfred S. Forsyth, Sigmund Anderman and David Perlmutter, Winer, Neuburger & Sive, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees-appellants Citizens Committee, Sierra Club and Village of Tarrytown.

Robert S. Lynch, Atty., Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Shiro Kashiwa, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Edmund B. Clark, Atty., Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., Robert M. Morgenthau, U.S. Atty. for Southern District of New York, New York City, and Peter R. DeFilippi, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, of counsel), for appellants Volpe et al.

Joel H. Sachs, Asst. Atty Gen., New York City (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., of the State of New York, Albany, N.Y., and Mark T. Walsh, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for intervenor-appellant-appellee-McMorran.

The Wilderness Society, represented by Marshall, Bratter, Greene, Allison & Tucker, New York City, James Marshall and Henry Winestine, New York City, of counsel, amicus curiae.

The National Parks Association, represented by David E. Birenbaum, Washington, D.C., Strasser, Spiegelberg, Fried, Frank & Kampelman, Washington, D.C., of counsel, amici curiae.

Before Moore and Kaufman, Circuit Judges, and Ryan,* District Judge.

MOORE, Circuit Judge:

The present appeal is a consolidation ordered by this Court on October 27, 1969, of several separate appeals taken from a final order and judgment entered by the district court on July 25, 1969. Trial and judgment below in turn followed a consolidation of four separate actions brought by the various plaintiffs against the various defendants here on appeal. The opinion of the district court, setting out the facts, the various claims and Judge Murphy's conclusions of law, is reported at 302 F.Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y.1969).

These actions arose out of a proposal by the New York State Department of Transportation for construction of the Hudson River Expressway. The plaintiffs object to the proposed construction of a six-lane arterial highway, designed for both commercial and passenger traffic, along a ten-mile stretch of the Hudson River's eastern bank between Tarrytown and Crotonville. Before construction of the Expressway can begin, the New York Department of Transportation must secure the approval of certain federal agencies, because the planned construction requires dredging and filling in a portion of the Hudson River along the shoreline, and the Hudson is a navigable waterway under federal jurisdiction. The New York Department of Transportation proposes placing some 9,500,000 cubic yards of fill, bound by a rock wall, along a portion of the river's bank. The landfill would extend, at its widest point, approximately 1,300 feet (nearly a quarter of a mile) into the Hudson.

Upon application of the State of New York, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issued a permit authorizing the dredge and fill operation pursuant to its authority under the Rivers and

*Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Arguing that the proposed construction involved both a "dike" and a "causeway" within the meaning of § 401, the plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the permit as issued was beyond the scope of the Army's authority, and (2) injunctive relief to prohibit the issuance of any permit or the commencement of any construction in the absence of congressional consent and approval of the Secretary of Transportation.[1] The dis-

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[1] Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, section 9, 33 U.S.C. § 401, provides in pertinent part:

"It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over or in any * * * navigable river * * * of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army * * *."

The defendants contend that construction of the landfill as proposed was referable only to section 10 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403, which provides in part:

"The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any * * * navigable river, or other water of the United States * * * except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill [in a navigable waterway of the United States] * * * unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same."

Approval of the Secretary of Transportation is required where construction of a bridge or causeway is contemplated by virtue of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g) (1966), which transferred jurisdiction over bridges and causeways from the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of Transportation. See Judge Murphy's discussion of the statutory interrelationships in the opinion below, 302 F.Supp. at 1087.

trict court agreed, finding that a 4½ mile rock wall jutting into the river constituted a "dike" and that the Expressway project would require construction of a "causeway" before its completion. The district court held that the Corps had breached a nondiscretionary duty to secure the consent of Congress and the approval of the Secretary of Transportation before issuing the permit. The permit was declared void, and the court granted the injunctive relief sought against the federal defendants and against J. Burch McMorran, the New York Commissioner of Transportation. All defendants appeal from this order.

The plaintiffs also appealed from a portion of the district court's order which dismissed their claims against McMorran as a primary defendant. These claims challenged the constitutionality of the Expressway Law,[2] which authorized McMorran as Commissioner of Transportation to fix the exact route of the roadway and oversee its construction, and of section 30 of New York Highway Law, which prescribes the condemnation procedures in connection with highway construction. They also claimed that a lump sum appropriation by the New York legislature for general highway construction was an impermissible delegation of the spending authority. Their final claim was an

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[2] Highway Law § 340c, as amended. (McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 25, 1966), reads in pertinent part:

"Beginning at a point on interstate route 503 in the vicinity of Beacon or Wiccopee, to be determined by the superintendent of public works [now the Commissioner of Transportation], thence in a generally southerly direction to the vicinity of Ossining and thence continuing southerly, west of U.S. route nine, along or near the Hudson River to a connection or connections with existing highways, as determined by the [Commissioner of Transportation] in the vicinity of the structure on the Governor Thomas E. Dewey Thruway known as 'The Tappan Zee Bridge.'"

equitable action against McMorran charging violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act in seeking to proceed with construction of the Hudson River landfill without congressional consent and approval of the Secretary of Transportation. The district court dismissed these claims, but granted injunctive relief against McMorran as intervenor-defendant in the actions against the federal defendants.

Important threshold questions on this appeal involve the jurisdiction of the district court over the subject matter of these actions, and the standing of these plaintiffs to seek review of agency action in federal court. We turn first to jurisdiction.

I.

The district court rested its jurisdiction on the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. IV). Section 702 provides as follows: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Section 704 states that "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." Section 706(2)(C) permits the reviewing court to set aside agency action found to exceed the agency's statutory authority.

The statute pursuant to which the Army Chief of Engineers issued the disputed permit contains no provision for judicial review, nor does it include specific procedures for appeal of the Army's decision. Review of the action is therefore determined by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, applicable to all administrative actions or proceedings "except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judi-

cial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV). Nothing in the Rivers and Harbors Act suggests that judicial review is precluded, and it is clear from a reading of § 401 that approval of projects involving the construction of "dikes" and "causeways," rather than being "committed to agency discretion by law," was, on the contrary, expressly reserved to Congress. The federal defendants contend that the landfill permit was governed by § 403, committing certain types of shoreline construction to the Army's discretion. But whether or not the Army could exercise its authority under § 403 without reference to § 401 was a matter of statutory construction obviously subjected to full review in the district court by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. The district court properly relied on the presumption of reviewability embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act where there was no evidence of a congressional intent to prohibit review in the Rivers and Harbors Act. As the Supreme Court has twice held "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); accord, Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379–380, 82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962); Kletscha v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966).

There can be no question at this late date that Congress intended by the Administrative Procedure Act to assure comprehensive review of "a broad spectrum of administrative actions," including those made reviewable by specific statutes without adequate review provisions as well as those for which no review is available under any other statute. Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, *supra*, 387 U.S. at 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507; *see* S.Rep.No. 752, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. 26 (1945); H.R.Rep No. 1980, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., 41 (1946). Since the Army's issuance of this permit was final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court, and review is not clearly and convincingly precluded by the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Administrative Procedure Act must be read to confer equitable jurisdiction on the district court to protect by injunctive relief such rights as the plaintiff may have standing to assert. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 1969). In our discussion of standing, *infra*, we conclude that these plaintiffs are "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute" and are therefore entitled to review. The district court has the power under § 706 to set aside agency action in excess of statutory authority, and we agree with the district court that issuance of the permit here exceeded the Army's authority. Under these circumstances, if the Administrative Procedure Act could not itself serve as a basis for jurisdiction, the important goal of subjecting final agency action to judicial scrutiny would be frustrated. We therefore conclude that the district court properly assumed jurisdiction.

II.

Reference was likewise made to the Administrative Procedure Act to determine the plaintiffs' standing to obtain review. Their right to review was based on the Act's provision that "[a] person suffering legal wrong or * * * aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702. Two of the plaintiffs (the Citizens Committee and the Sierra Club) made no claim that the proposed Expressway or the

issuance of the dredge and fill permit threatened any direct personal or economic harm to them. Instead they asserted the interest of the public in the natural resources, scenic beauty and historical value of the area immediately threatened with drastic alteration, claiming that they were "aggrieved" when the Corps acted adversely to the public interest. They are, as the federal defendants observe, serving as "private Attorney Generals" to protect the public interest. See Associated Industries of State of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).

Allowance of standing to private attorneys general in "public actions"[3] challenging administrative activity is by no means a new or unusual concept. See *Associated Industries v. Ickes, supra; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ* v. *F.C.C.*, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994 (1966); *Reade* v. *Ewing*, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953); cf. *Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.* v. *F.C.C.*, 316 U.S. 4, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86 L.Ed. 1229 (1942); *F.C.C.* v. *Sanders Brothers Radio Station*, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869, 1037 (1940). It is significant that standing in such cases has derived from judicial interpretation of the statutory term "aggrieved" as descriptive of persons entitled to review. This under the Federal Communications Act, where agency action assertedly contravened the public interest, private litigants were held to be "persons aggrieved" with standing "only as representatives of the public interest." *Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.* v. *F.C.C., supra*, 316 U.S. at 14, 62 S.Ct. at 882; L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 499 (1965).

The Supreme Court has observed that the law of

[3] See generally L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Adminjstrative Action 459–500 (1965); K. Davis, Administrative Law § 22.05 (1958).

standing is a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations * * *." *United States ex rel. Chapman* v. *F.P.C.*, 345 U.S. 153, 156, 73 S.Ct. 609, 612, 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953). Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, in his *Office of Communication of United Church of Christ* v. *F.C.C.*, *supra*, opinion characterized the concept of standing as "a practical and functional one designed to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding * * *." *Id.* 359 F.2d at 1002.[4] But the Supreme Court has recently cautioned that "[t]here must in addition [to adversary interest] be some connection between the official action challenged and some legally protected interest of the party challenging the action." *Jenkins* v. *McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 423, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1850, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). With these principles in mind, we must examine the nature of the interest these plaintiffs are seeking to protect, and the appropriateness of their claim to represent the public in demanding that protection.

We have already described the situation confronting the plaintiffs—the prospect of massive alteration of the Hudson River shoreline and of the physical environment for some ten miles along the river's bank.

[4] In *Church of Christ*, a citizens group pressing an organized protest against renewal by the FCC of a radio broadcasters license, alleging that the broadcaster had ignored the listening needs of nearly half the listening audience, was held to have standing before the Commission as a group representative of broadcast "consumers." Judge Burger treated the question of standing before the Commission as equivalent to standing for judicial review, 359 F.2d at 1000 n. 8, and cited as authority for his grant of standing to members of the general public, *inter alia*, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F. P. C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).

The Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley (Citizens Committee) is an unincorporated association of citizens who reside near the proposed Expressway. The Sierra Club is a national conservation organization with substantial membership also in the area of the Expressway, and a history of involvement in the preservation of national scenic and recreational resources. Tarrytown is an incorporated village, and the planned Expressway would pass through its boundaries at the southern end of the roadway. All plaintiffs made a vigorous effort to present their views to the New York Department of Transportation and to the federal officials responsible for granting the disputed permit. They have evidenced the seriousness of their concern with local natural resources by organizing for the purpose of cogently expressing it, and the intensity of their concern is apparent from the considerable expense and effort they have undertaken in order to protect the public interest which they believe is threatened by official action of the federal and state governments. In short, they have proved the genuineness of their concern by demonstrating that they are "willing to shoulder the burdensome and costly processes of intervention" in an administrative proceeding. *United Church of Christ, supra,* 359 F.2d at 1005. They have "by their activities and conduct * * * exhibited a special interest in" the preservation of the natural resources of the Hudson Valley. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf., 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965). It remains for us to examine whether there is legal justification for their intervention—whether there is a "legally protected interest" at stake which they can assert because of their special concern.

In *Scenic Hudson, supra,* we set aside an order of the Federal Power Commission granting a license to

Consolidated Edison Company of New York to construct a hydroelectric project on the west side of the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain. Finding that the Federal Power Act required the Commission to consider as a factor in granting such a license "recreational purposes" of waterway development,[5] we held that persons asserting an interest in that factor were "aggrieved" within the meaning of that statute's review provisions when the Commission decided adversely with respect to their claims.[6] The expression by Congress in the Federal Power Act of a concern for the environmental effect which the agency's action could be expected to exert was interpreted to create express statutory protection for the public's interest in conservation of environmental resources, and organizations with a demonstrated concern for those resources could claim that statutory protection for the public.

The Rivers and Harbors Act has no review provisions corresponding to those in the Federal Power Act. Nevertheless, persons "aggrieved" by

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[5] Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) reads in part:

"All licenses issued * * * shall be on the following conditions: (a) That the project adopted * * * shall be such as in the judgment of the Commissioner will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes; * * *"

[6] The pertinent review provisions are contained in section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825*l*(b):

"(b) Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the order relates is located * * *."

agency action pursuant to that statute are entitled to review on similar terms by the Administrative Procedure Act. We agree with the conclusion of Judge McLean in Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F.Supp. 650, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) that the meaning of "aggrieved" in one act is not different from its meaning in the other. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that a person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Those plaintiffs, alleging that the Corps and the Secretary of the Army ignored their environmental concerns, are "aggrieved" within the meaning of at least three "relevant statute[s]." The Department of Transportation Act[3] declares "the national policy that special effort should

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[2] The defendants concede that the *Road Review* decision, if correct, is controlling here. *Road Review* was decided under the Federal Highways Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.* which, like the Rivers and Harbors Act, contained no review provisions. Judge McLean relied on the Administrative Procedure Act to find both jurisdiction over the subject matter and standing for the plaintiffs, among whom were non-profit civic organizations and a town, for practical purposes identical to the plaintiffs in the present case. As our present decision makes clear, we believe Judge McLean's decision in *Road Review* was correct.

[3] Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended by § 18(b) of the Act of August 23, 1968, 82 Stat. 824, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. IV). The merits of the plaintiffs' claims are entwined with their standing to maintain them. One of their contentions was that a portion of the proposed expressway constituted a causeway and, therefore, that the Corps erred in failing to secure the consent of the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to the Department of Transportation Act. Since we are in agreement with the district court that the plans for the expressway did envision the construction of a causeway, see *infra*, the Department of Transportation Act is a "relevant" statute, and the concern it evidences for preservation of the environment serves to reinforce our decision that the plaintiffs have standing to maintain this action.

be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside * * *," and requires consideration of recreational resources and historical values before the Secretary can approve projects under its jurisdiction. The Hudson River Basin Compact Act, P.L. 89–605, 89 Stat. 847 (1966) embodies the conclusion of Congress that the Hudson River basin contains resources of "immense economic, natural, scenic, historic and recreational value to all the citizens of the United States," and instructs all agencies to consider those resources in planning or approving activities affecting the area. One of the regulations under which the Corps of Engineers issued the present permit provides the following:

> * * * the decision as to whether a permit will be issued must rest on an evaluation of all relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish, and wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general public interest. 33 CFR 209.120(d).[9]

Thus administrative as well as congressional concern for natural resources in the present exercise of federal authority is evident. We hold, therefore, that the public interest in environmental resources—an interest created by statutes affecting the issuance of this permit—is a legally protected interest affording these plaintiffs, as responsible representatives of

[9] See also Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 662(a); Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 742a *et seq.*; Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army, 33 CFR 209.120(d)(11). Claims relevant to most of these factors were advanced by the plaintiffs throughout the proceedings in connection with their contention that issuance of the permit was "arbitrary and capricious." The district court did not reach the "arbitrary and capricious" claim in deciding for the plaintiffs, and we need not consider it here.

the public, standing to obtain judicial review of agency action alleged to be in contravention of that public interest. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F. P. C., *supra;* State of Washington Dept. of Game v. F. P. C., 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953); Road Review League v. Boyd, *supra.*

III.

The federal defendants challenge the standing of the Village of Tarrytown on a somewhat different ground. Conceding that the Village may have standing to challenge construction of the Expressway itself,[10] they contend that issuance of the fill permit could not have a direct effect on the Village and therefore no standing exists to challenge the permit. This argument ignores the realities confronting the Village of Tarrytown. It is true that the Corps of Engineers cannot affirmatively control the entire Expressway project, as the Federal Power Commission controlled the project at issue in *Scenic Hudson,* and that all that is required of the Corps is "acquiescence" in parts of the State's proposed construction. Nevertheless, federal acquiescence in the project would spell immediate jeopardy to substantial interests of the Village, because once the permit issues, the State of New York can commence the costly dredging and filling operation and proceed inexorably on the course of highway construction to which the Village objects. The Village would be hard put at some later date to overbalance the equities in favor of the State such a large commitment of public funds would engender and its legiti-

[10] The district court found that the Village of Tarrytown would suffer "loss of tax revenues and interference with the Urban Renewal project already in progress in the Village." 302 F.Supp. at 1092. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d at 616.

mate concern could be irretrievably subverted even though the permit was issued unlawfully. Although the fill itself will not have a significant direct effect on the special interests demonstrated by Tarrytown, the effect of the permit will have a substantial impact. Without the permit, New York cannot begin construction of the Expressway along the presently planned route. With it, condemnation proceedings and construction can commence all along that route. We think the concept of standing is sufficiently "practical and functional" to permit Tarrytown to take advantage of federal remedies to avoid the substantial impact of the consequences flowing from issuance by federal agencies of the disputed permit.

IV.

We turn now briefly to the merits of the controversy. After 29 days of trial, during which numerous exhibits were offered (including a model of the proposed Expressway), experts were examined, maps, charts and technical dictionaries were consulted and the facts were exhaustively presented, the district court concluded that construction of both a "dike" and a "causeway" were contemplated by the State. The court was called upon to construe the meaning of those terms as they were used in § 401 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, and as they applied in fact to the Expressway plans before it. Having carefully reviewed the pertinent evidence and considered the governing rules of statutory construction, we adopt the conclusion of the district court that the word "dike", used by the defendants in their permit has the same meaning there as in § 401 of the Act, and that construction of a dike is forbidden by that Section without the consent of Congress.

We likewise agreed that the Corps of Engineers should not have ignored the prospect that a "causeway" within the meaning of § 401 was to be a part of the project it was approving, and that approval of the Secretary of Transportation would later be required. Any further federal role in consideration of this massive project would be effectively foreclosed by the Army's acquiescence in a 9.5 million cubic-yard landfill, to be undertaken at great expense to the New York taxpayers. Indeed Congress, which also must approve construction of a causeway over navigable waters, would, in practical effect, be precluded from reversing such a course of action already begun pursuant to the present permit issued by the Army.

V.

The district court held that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims were without merit, and we agree. As we understand their argument, three separate delegations of power to McMorran combine to constitute, in their view, an abdication of legislative responsibility in construction of this Expressway. The Expressway law itself is an eight-line statute [11] describing generally the terminal points and route of the highway and prescribing that, between Ossining and the Tappan Zee Bridge, the roadbed is to proceed west of Highway 9 and "along or near" the Hudson River. Second, section 30 of New York's Highway Law allows McMorran to condemn property needed for highway construction, and sets forth the procedures to be followed in condemnation. These procedures are themselves challenged as violative of due process. Third, the legislature's lump sum appropriation for highway construction to the Department of Transportation

[11] Note 2, *supra*.

permits McMorran considerable latitude in deciding how the highway money is to be spent. The plaintiffs argue that, with all the discretion over condemnation of property, expenditure of funds and fixing of routes afforded to McMorran by this combination of legislation, the "aggregation of power" vested in him violates the citizens' right to due process.

On this appeal, the plaintiffs have not developed the facts or the law sufficiently to be persuasive. The Expressway statute certainly offers very little guidance for major decision which the Department of Transportation is authorized to make. McMorran cites a bevy of regulations, as does the district court, as restrictions on this power, but few of them appear to be relevant to these major decisions. Thus the statute itself sets the bounds of McMorran's discretion, which is very broad. However, nullification of statutory delegations of discretionary authority in major public works projects on grounds of due process is quite rare, and the plaintiffs offer virtually no authority for judicial intervention along the lines they propose. Indeed authorities closest in point are to the contrary. See Ahoyian v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 211 F.Supp. 668, 669 (D.Mass.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 186, 83 S.Ct. 265, 9 L.Ed.2d 228 (1962); Sleepy Hollow Valley Commission v. McMorran, 20 N.Y.2d 190, 195–197, 282 N.Y.S.2d 242, 229 N.E.2d 32 (1967); cf. Seneca Nation of Indians v. United States, 338 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1964). We agree with the district court that these claims must be rejected.

Affirmed.

APPENDIX D

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in the City of New York, on the sixteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred and seventy.

Present: Hon. Leonard P. Moore, Irving R. Kaufman, Circuit Judges, and Hon. Sylvester J. Ryan, District Judge.

Nos. 428–33—September Term, 1969)

(Argued December 8, 1969; Decided April 16, 1970)

(Docket Nos. 34010, 34057–58, 34081, 34099, 34100)

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY, THE SIERRA CLUB AND THE VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

against

JOHN VOLPE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

J. BURCH MCMORRAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, INTERVENOR-APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the order of said District Court be and it hereby is affirmed.

A. DANIEL FUSARO,
Clerk.

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